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T1HE PROVISION of air services to geographically remote ar-
eas can be critical for their economic growth. Small states
with comparatively smaller economies often suffer from a lack of
air-service provision as a consequence of their size.' Insufficient
domestic capital can restrain profitable operations by a national
carrier, and the states' small geographic and economic size may
result in less economic activity and, by extension, demand for
air-service access.2 As a result, international access to small
states often falls to foreign airlines who understandably seek
positive returns from passenger traffic and cargo operations.
Paradoxically, such services are somewhat tenuous in that their
ability to generate positive yields can be limited as a result of
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serving thin markets and thin routes.' Small origin-market size
and significantly smaller (comparatively) demand for destina-
tion traffic can impede revenue, yield, and, ultimately,
EBITDAR4 margins. Volatile economic conditions-notably pe-
riods of significant demand slump, such as the global economic
crisis of 2008 and 2009-can further hamper profitable per-
formance in markets where foreign carriers operate to remote
destinations.
Not surprisingly, then, those states separated from key source
markets by large distances (both physical and network) may
have economically valid reasons for ensuring that air-transport
accessibility is maintained. This is especially the case when valu-
able foreign exchange earnings from visitors are at risk. A stra-
tegic policy question for these instances therefore becomes what
levers are available for remote destinations to attract and main-
tain sufficient air services for the benefit of trade in goods and
services?
The purpose of this article is to review the conditions that may
lead to an operational cost-share agreement between a state and
a foreign commercial airline. A related purpose is to review the
resulting implications for wider government-based policies relat-
ing to connectivity in instances where demand for access is low.
Attention is directed toward thin-market policy options for re-
mote states. Thin markets are revealed when (a) demand for
travel to a destination is limited due to relative utility achieved
through substitutes, (b) supply-side variables such as geographic
size (e.g., small islands) and development barriers limit econo-
mies of scale, or both. We argue that cost-share agreements may
be efficient when existing market demand is insufficient for a
foreign airline to continue service without subsidization and
that the resulting arrangement may have critical implications for
future market development as well as general stated policies on
trade in goods and services.
The article begins with a brief review of the economic geogra-
phy of connectivity and accessibility in the context of destination
prosperity and development potential. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of the elementary economics of air-service subsidies with
the focus on different approaches to subsidies that can be lev-
3 James Nolan, Pamela Ritchie, and John Rowcroft, Small Market Service and
Regional Policy, 39 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'y 363, 364 (2005).
4 EBITDAR is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization,
and Rent.
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ied. A case study of the Cook Islands in the South Pacific is then
presented as an example of the union of both issues, demon-
strating that the policy dimensions of optimal choice ex ante for
autochthonous states is that which minimizes loss ex post. After
considering the implications for these types of cost-share ar-
rangements on access policy and strategy, some future prospects
for such agreements are discussed in the conclusion.
II. CONNECTIVITY AND ACCESSIBILITY: THE
ANTECEDENTS OF COST SHARING
A brief review of the importance of connectivity and accessi-
bility demonstrates the value of cost-sharing arrangements. The
context within which air-service subsidization becomes a policy
option is not only embedded within a state's political and eco-
nomic ties to wider streams of trade and commerce but also
within its relative measure of geographic accessibility and con-
nectivity. We are here less interested in connectivity as a mea-
surable tool for maximizing efficient capital allocation across a
network,' but more in the concept of connectivity as a mecha-
nism that leads to conclusions regarding general economic de-
velopment, both actual and potential. Doing so puts transport
access-particularly air access-firmly within the scope of gov-
ernment policy. Transport connectivity and accessibility are crit-
ical for economic balance and sustainability; the health of a
state's economy can be linked to the extent to which it is con-
nected, and thus integrated, within a network.6 With respect to
tourism-development potential, access and connectivity can be
just as critical as marketing efforts or product development.7
Geographic analyses of accessibility consider variables such as
the number of nodes and their spatial dispersion, although
under a gravity model, the size of particular nodes can also fac-
tor into the relative demand for access.8 Small or more remote
nodes, then, are at a relative geographical disadvantage. This
5 See Guillaume Burghouwt et al., Air Network Performance and Hub Competitive
Position: Evaluation of Primary Airports in East and South-East Asia, 3 AIRPORT MGMT.
384, 386 (2009).
6 See David Banister & Yossi Berechman, Transport Investment and the Promotion
of Economic Growth, 9 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 209, 209-10 (2001).
7 See Andreas Papatheodorou, Civil Aviation Regimes and Leisure Tourism in Eu-
rope, 8J. AIR TRANsP. MGMT. 381, 385-87 (2002).
s Darren M. Scott et al., Network Robustness Index: A New Method for Identifying
Critical Links and Evaluating the Performance of Transportation Networks, 14 J. TRASP.
GEOGRAPHY 215, 218-21 (2006).
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can have significant implications for the provision of commer-
cial-transport services to those destinations. The economic via-
bility of a network of nodes and their related interconnects can
be derived from the demand for interaction across multiple
node pairings. Thus, traditional9 geographic measures of net-
works include gamma calculations, e.g., y = e/e, , where e is the
number of links in a network.' Such models can assist network
planning by assessing demand through Newtonian-based gravity
considerations but may not necessarily account for market vari-
ances and features.'1
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) noted
that connectivity has a net positive impact on productivity and
can have important implications for policy-notably a conscious
attempt at liberalization or a continuance, depending on ex-
isting degrees of liberalization-the degree of competitiveness
in the market, and the extent to which aviation contributes to
economic growth. 12 A connectivity model developed by IATA
features Chicago O'Hare and London Heathrow as the most
connected because of their relative connectivity to other highly
connected destinations.13 Where this discussion becomes perti-
nent to the concept of cost sharing is the extent to which con-
nectivity has an impact on remote destinations that are not
connected nearly as well. This can be explained in many ways,
although it is likely that weak demand as a consequence of
small-market access is perhaps most indicative.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF AIR-SERVICE SUBSIDIES
While the term "cost share" is used here more or less as a
concept derived from the public-policy literature, it is acknowl-
edged that a more accurate commercial description follows typi-
cal economic definitions of a direct subsidy. For our purposes, a
subsidy is any financial instrument put in place by a government
or public body to directly benefit a domestic or foreign private
9 Studies from the 1950s and 1960s in the spatial geography literature sought
to utilize interaction and graph theory to understand flows. Such studies have
since given way to quantitatively advanced methods in geography, such as GIS
mapping, and advanced econometrics. Nonetheless, these still serve as a useful
basis for understanding the principles of traffic flows.
10 Scott et al., supra note 8, at 219.
11 See I.G. Heggie, Are Gravity and Interactuance Models a Valid Technique for Plan-
ning Regional Transport Facilities?, 20 OPERATIONAL RES. 93, 93-108 (1969).
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firm for the purpose of assisting production.' 4 Subsidies are
often implemented to protect infant industries or to secure do-
mestic production of a good or service within unbalanced mar-
kets and, thus, can be designed to correct market failure, often
in lack-of-output form. 5 Criticisms of subsidies generally relate
to the resulting artificial distortion of markets. 6
The use of subsidies as a policy lever, especially surrounding
implementation and legal ramifications, were the subject of
global-trade negotiations leading up to the Geneva round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations
in 1947.17 Since then, however, precise definitions have not
achieved substantive international agreement. As the Uruguay
Round of GATT did not clarify the subject definitively, the defi-
nition of a subsidy and the extent to which subsidies are used
and justified globally on various goods and services remains
variable.'"
A. SUBSIDY VARIANTS IN AIR-SERVICE PROVISION
Subsidization in air-service provision can occur at varying
levels.19 First, and from a regulatory perspective, states may hold
majority shareholding in a provider either out of necessity, as a
result of a recapitalization effort, or as a means of ensuring that
iconic "flag" status is maintained. Further, a state may restrict
seventh or fifth freedom air rights in an effort to protect the
routes of a national carrier.2 ° Specific routes may be protected
through the awarding of monopoly rights to a specific carrier,
subject to any potential regulatory restrictions within existing air
service memoranda.2' Second, withholding criteria associated
with air-service arrangements, such as strict ownership and con-
trol regulations, can be classified as a form of indirect subsidiza-
tion of air services in that they restrict potential foreign-
14 E.g., BRiAN McDONALD, THE WORLD TRAVELING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND 103 (St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1998).
15 Id. at 100.
16 Id. at 98.
17 Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's Uruguay Round, 60
J. AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1194 (1995).
18 Id. at 1201-05.
19 See Table 2 infra Part V.
20 Freedoms of the Air, INT'L CIL AVIATION ORG., [ICAO] http://www.icao.
int/icao/en/trivia/freedoms-air.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
21 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 368.
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designated entrants from starting new services. 22 Third, com-
mercial joint ventures between airlines, airports, and destination
marketing organizations are becoming more common. One re-
cent example is the partnership between American Airlines and
the Chicago Convention and Tourism Bureau.23
A fourth method of subsidization involves direct government
subsidy where the goal is to ensure an airline's costs are covered
either wholly or in part.24 In practice, subsidization of commer-
cial air services to preserve accessibility and connectivity is not
uncommon. Several examples of direct subsidies for air-service
provision can be found, some of which can be traced back to
early periods of commercial air transport.25 In the late 1950s,
the International Civil Aviation Organization commissioned a
study to investigate the economic implications of long-range jet
transport, the results of which noted that:
Governments may need to reexamine certain aspects of their
civil air transport policies in the light of the new situation to de-
cide such questions as the extent to which airlines should be as-
sisted by such means as direct subsidy, or relaxation of taxation
measures and policies for charging for the use of airports and air
navigation facilities. They may need to review the arrangements
by which commercial rights are at present granted, and also to
consider the desirability of increasing contributions to technical
assistance funds and of participating in new joint financing
schemes.26
Subsidization can take the form of national public-service pol-
icies. Examples designed to ensure air services to remote desti-
22 Yu-Chun Chang & George Williams, Changing the Rules-Amending the Nation-
ality Clauses in Air Services Agreements, 7J. AR TRANsp. MGMT. 207, 208 (2001). A
simplified example is Brisbane-Auckland-Rarotonga (BNE-AKL-RAR) services
operated by Pacific Blue (AUS) Pty Ltd (although wet leasing aircraft from Pa-
cific Blue Airlines (NZ)). Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) is effectively controlled in
Australia, and thus the BNE-AKL sector is necessary because Australian and inter-
national services originating in New Zealand must be operated by airlines with
effective control and substantial ownership in New Zealand, given neither have
exchanged seventh freedom passenger rights. Similarly, third country carriers
operating across the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand do so cur-
rently under fifth-freedom routings with either country serving as the beyond or
intermediate point.
23 News Release, Chicago Convention & Tourism Bureau, CCTB/American
Airlines Expand Strategic Marketing Partnership (June 18, 2010).
24 Myron W. Watkins, The Aviation Industry, 39J. POL. ECON. 42, 52-53 (1931).
25 Id.
26 News Release, L.C. Boussard, Pub. Info. Officer, ICAO, The Economic Im-
plications of Long-Range Jet Air Transportation (Aug. 4, 1958).
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nations can be found worldwide, including the United States'
Essential Air Services program, 27 Australia's Remote Air Services
Subsidy Scheme, 2' and the European Union's Public Service
Obligations program.29 In their comparative review, George
Williams and Romano Pagliari found widely varying policies on
the application of direct subsidies as public services for air ser-
vices within Europe, querying whether a more equitable central-
ization of air service subsidization should be implemented at the
level of the European Union rather than through individual
member states. ° Of course, subsidies in air transport in general
extend well beyond air-service provision, with perhaps the most
publicized example being the alleged protectionist policies of
the European community and U.S. government over subsidiza-
tion of Airbus and Boeing aircraft production.3
Subsidization can also function as a policy option for cities or
regions that would otherwise not be considered remote from ei-
ther a connectivity or accessibility perspective. Several recent
examples highlight what is likely a growing trend in direct subsi-
dization of service by governments at varying levels.32 In the
United States, AirTran confirmed in June 2009 that its opera-
tions out of Wichita Mid-Continent Airport were profitable only
as a result of direct subsidies in the amount of $6.5 million from
the city, county, and state.3 Similarly, it was reported in July
27 49 U.S.C. §§ 41732-33 (2007).
28 Remote Air Services Subsidy Scheme, AUST. GoV'T DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE &
TRANSP., http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/regional/rass.aspx (last up-
dated Jan. 10, 2011).
29 Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 4(1)(a), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 3.
30 George Williams & Romano Pagliari, A Comparative Analysis of the Application
and Use of Public Service Obligations in Air Transport Within the EU, 11 TRANSP. POL'Y
55, 60-63 (2004).
31 Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO's "Toughest" Case: An Examination of the Effec-
tiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute over Air-
craft Subsidies, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM 191, 197-205 (2006).
32 BUREAU OF ECON., ENERGY, & Bus. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 INVEST-
MENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - AUSTRALIA (2009); Joel Millman & Mike Esterl, Air
Hubs Pay to Keep their Spokes, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009 at A3; Andrew Heasley,
Tiger Claws into Leisure Market-With Government's Help, THE AGE, June 3, 2010,
http://www.theage.com.au/travel/travel-news/tiger-claws-into-leisure-market-
with-governments-help-20100603-x25x.html; Thomas Cook Warns Canaries "Unfair
Subsidies to Ryanair: We Could Cut Capacity to the Canary Islands'" BARCELONA REP.,
Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.barcelonareporter.com/index.php?/news/com-
ments/thomas cookwarnscanariesunfair subsidiest-o-ryanairwecouldcut
_capacit/; AirTran Chief Calls Public Money Crucial, (KSN television broadcastJune
24, 2009).
33 AirTran Chief Calls Public Money Crucial, supra note 32.
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2009 that Portland, Oregon directed a lump-sum subsidy in the
amount of $3.5 million to Delta Air Lines to maintain direct
links between the city and Tokyo, which were reported to be
worth $61.2 million to the immediate region. 4 In Australia, the
Victorian government reportedly provided an undisclosed in-
centive to Tiger Airways Australia (effectively controlled in Sin-
gapore 5 ) to provide domestic services from Avalon Airport in
Melbourne."
In Europe, there has been concern raised over the subsidiza-
tion of carriers by airports seeking to attract continued or new
services.37 A report from April 2010 revealed the concerns held
by distributor and charter airline operator Thomas Cook over
discounted aeronautical fees-read by some critics as a sub-
sidy-for the launch of summer 2010 Ryanair services to the Ca-
nary Islands from the United Kingdom."' Thomas Cook argued
that the discounted fees would result in reduced services offered
to its own charter operations.3 9 This example illustrates how
balancing competition against minimum-required access for so-
cial-welfare maximization can be a delicate endeavor. European
Commission guidelines state that aid for new services should be
allowed for a maximum of five years in the case of remote
regions. 4°
B. DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OF FOREIGN AiRLINES
A cost-sharing agreement that captures subsidization can in-
volve the state providing a direct underwrite of services provided
by a foreign airline, thus constituting an irregular direct eco-
nomic subsidy.41 The conditions necessary for such an under-
write to be applicable exist: (a) when demand for travel along
specific origin-destination pairings is not robust enough to war-
34 Millman & Esterl, supra note 32.
35 BuREAu OF ECON., ENERGY, & Bus. AFFAIRS, supra note 32. Australia's domes-
tic market is fully deregulated with respect to ownership and effective control,
thus foreign nationals are permitted to own 100% of a domestic carrier, although
this is subject to approval from the country's Foreign Investment Review Board.
36 Heasley, supra note 32.
37 Thomas Cook Warns Canaries, supra note 32.
38 Id.
59 Id.
40 2005 0J. (C 312) 1, 13; Commission Decision 2004/393, 0J. (L 137).
These guidelines arise from a highly publicized case involving Ryanair, Walloon
Region, and Brussels South Charleroi Airport.
41 James Rude, Direct and Indirect Export Subsidies, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE POLICy 282-83 (William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford eds., 2007).
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rant entry by a private provider, at least on a continual and prof-
itable basis; and (b) where states may not have sufficient capital
to provide even state-owned air services. While the application
of utility functions at the level of the state may not be generally
feasible,42 it can be suggested that in instances where direct sub-
sidization of air services as a rational policy instrument is intro-
duced, utility is nonetheless maximized for the sake of national
interest.
Consideration should be given to whether subsidies may be
considered protectionist. Subsidization of air services may be
contentious, given that some markets are effective oligopolies.
In thin-market situations, provision of air services is left to one
operator operating ostensibly as a monopolist. Barriers to entry
may not be entirely insurmountable but are certainly present.
Expressed another way, subsidization of air services would be
more prevalent in monopoly situations because it is only
through direct subsidization of operating costs that profitability
is achieved by the monopolist when the absence of subsidization
results in marginal costs exceeding marginal revenue. If air-ser-
vice provision generates positive externalities in the form of in-
creased profits for local businesses, subsidizing an otherwise
unprofitable route may improve social welfare.
An exact determination of the optimal subsidy-which de-
pends on the precise nature of demand, production costs, exter-
nal benefits, and the relative negotiating positions of the state
and the monopolist-would require detailed econometric analy-
ses.43 Necessary data (e.g., airline unit cost and revenue, seat
factors) for these types of analyses, however, are often unavaila-
ble for commercial reasons. In the absence of this data, we offer
guidance on suitable proxies for approaching policy decisions
regarding subsidization of an air-service provider.
It is reasonable to assume that thin markets give rise to mo-
nopoly market structures given the lack of interest by commer-
cial providers in offering services. Where origin-destination
pairings also involve long-distance thin routes, the destination
state may have a limited choice of airlines to whom a subsidy
could be offered and who are still willing to offer services. The
kind of subsidy offered can thus play an important role, and it is
possible to develop a hypothetical example of the conditions in-
42 ZEEV MAoz, NATIONAL CHOICES AND INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES 214-15
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
43 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 371.
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volved that illustrates the potential difficulty a state faces in es-
tablishing an optimum rate of subsidy. In such an example, the
profit function for a monopolist as a function of quantity, ru(q),
can be written as rr(q) = TR(q) - TC(q), where TR(q) and TC(q)
denote total revenue and total costs, respectively. Choosing q to
maximize profit yields the first order condition MR(q) = MC(q),
where MR(q) and MC(q) denote marginal revenue and marginal
cost, respectively. The necessary second order condition for
profit maximization is that profit at the optimal choices is non-
negative, or equivalently, the selling price must be greater than
or equal to average production costs, where production costs
include opportunity costs.
(a) no subsidy (b) lump-sum subsidy
. o. . ................... 
.... 
.¢
, MR D'10 Q o wtt
(c) per-unit subsdy (d) per-un.t subsidy with posive profits
FIGURE 1: SUBSIDIZATION OPTIONS UNDER
MONOPOLY CONDITIONS
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Monopoly behavior when average cost is greater than demand
is described in Figure la. For simplicity, we assume that the de-
mand curve (D) is linear and marginal costs (ca) are constant,44
but our conclusions are robust to alternative demand and cost
specifications. Average production costs are represented by the
AC ° curve. The monopolist will not operate if the average pro-
duction cost is greater than the price (Figure la). A subsidy is
therefore required to induce the monopolist to operate. The
subsidy may be a lump-sum payment or a per-unit rebate. A
lump-sum subsidy will not change marginal costs but will lower
average costs to AC 1, as shown in Figure 1b, resulting in the mo-
nopolist producing qO at price pO. A per-unit subsidy, on the
other hand, lowers marginal costs in addition to reducing aver-
e costs. This will induce the monopolist to increase output to
as in Figure I c.
It would be a coincidence if the per-unit subsidy that maxi-
mized state welfare resulted in zero profits when the monopolist
is free to choose price and quantity. If the marginal external
benefit of increasing the subsidy exceeds the marginal cost to
the state, the state will be better served by an output quantity
greater than q2. Such a situation is represented in Figure 1d,
where a larger per-unit subsidy results in production at q3.
There are also positive monopoly profits at q3. If there are sub-
sidy-fueled profits, the state ma be able to persuade the monop-
olist to provide more than q3. The eventual outcome would
depend on the negotiating power of the monopoly operator
and state. While we noted earlier that state subsidy of carriers in
thin-market situations would generally feature the potential
presence of one carrier, the fact that the state is incentivized to
provide a subsidy to a single carrier for the purposes of maximiz-
ing social welfare could mean that other carriers may be willing
to participate on the route or in the sector. In this case, if there
are many airlines to which the state could potentially offer the
subsidy, the state could dictate that the monopolist provides q4.
On the other hand, if one airline can service the route at signifi-
cantly lower costs than other airlines, the outcome will be close
to q3. In either case, if the state is able to command the quantity
produced, it is irrelevant whether a lump-sum or a per-unit sub-
sidy is offered as the quantity provided is no longer determined
-4 Logically, the addition of new aircraft in air service provision would cause
marginal costs to increase sharply.
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by the monopolist equating marginal revenue and marginal-pro-
duction costs.
IV. PUBLIC SUBSIDIES: A PACIFIC ISLANDS EXAMPLE
As an example of cost sharing in the form of a public subsidy,
and the resultant policy considerations that this brings, this sec-
tion critically examines a recent cost-sharing agreement, re-
ported as a "isk-share," between Air New Zealand and the
government of the Cook Islands. For comparison, discussion
also centers on direct subsidization of air services as a policy in-
strument identified by the government of New Zealand with re-
spect to other Pacific Island states. To begin, it is important to
situate the available connections from Rarotonga (RAR) to the
United States. Air Rarotonga services neighboring islands using
commuter aircraft (Saab 340, EMB1 10) but code shares with Air
Tahiti (VT) using a VT-registered ATR 72-500 for twice-weekly
RAR-Papeete services. 45 From Papeete, Air Tahiti Nui operates
daily A340-300 services to Los Angeles (LAX) .46 Air New Zea-
land operates weekly on the RAR-LAX route using a 767-300 in a
J24 Y210 configuration.
The Cook Islands News reported in September 2008 that the
existing year-old cost-sharing agreement between the Cook Is-
lands government and Air New Zealand-valued at NZ$2.9 mil-
lion-for the provision of non-stop LAX-RAR-LAX services was
being reconsidered and faced possible cancellation.4 7 A re-
newed agreement called for a NZ$5 million lump sum subsidy
from the Cook Islands government in order to ensure continua-
tion of services. 8 The agreement was ratified in November 2008
with effect from April 2009.40 From the perspective of the Cook
Islands, there is high value in non-stop LAX-RAR flights. 50 The
routing provides direct connectivity and reduces time factors in
access to visitors from North America. 51 European visitors also
45 Our Aircraft Fleet, AIR RARONTONGA, http://www.airraro.com/clientpages/
raro/fleet.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
46 AIR TAHITI Nui, http://www.airtahitinui-usa.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
47 Helen Greig, Weekly LA FRight Likely to Stop, COOK ISLANDS NEWS, Sept. 27,
2008, at 1.
48 Yvonne Tahara, Cooks Pays Air NA $5M to Keep Rarotonga Route, N.Z. HERALD,
Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid
=10544850.
49 Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air N4 STUFF.CO.NZ, Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.
stuff.co.nz/business/738867; Tahara, supra note 48.
50 See generally Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
51 See id.
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utilize transfers at LAX to the direct service. 52 Visitation statis-
tics demonstrate this raw importance with approximately 4,300
arrivals from the United States in 2007 (see Table 1) with an
average length-of-stay of ten days.
Year New Zealand United States Australia Total
2003 30921 7630 11470 78328
2004 38755 6026 11850 83333
2005 49088 4434 11313 88405
2006 51841 5476 11470 92351
2007 58931 4343 12445 97077
TABLE 1. ARRIVALS BY COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE - COOK ISLANDS
In a recent article, Tim Hazledine and Stephanie Collins state
that air services to many Pacific Islands carry passengers for
whom any singular island nation is not the sole destination.
Such multi-destination travel is provided by attractive fare struc-
tures and marketing efforts in key markets. 54 Removal of the
LAX-RAR-LAX service would essentially remove Cook Islands'
actual and perceived accessibility and connectivity. Thus, for
those passengers who travel on Star Alliance Circle Pacific
(branded multi-stop itineraries) or round-the-world routings,
the existence of the service means that a stop in RAR is possible.
Visibility on the network is thus critical. For the purposes of this
article, the economic rationale for the risk-share agreement can
be explored further in order to understand the political envi-
ronment that frames the agreement itself.
First, some assumptions must be made regarding the variable
cost structure-contributing to overall CASK (cost per available
seat kilometer)-of Air New Zealand operations on the route.
Specifically, it is feasible to assume that Air New Zealand could
well have faced LAX-RAR-LAX operations with average total
costs sitting above market demand for the service.55 Around the
52 Id.
53 COOK ISLAND TOURISM CORP. & N.Z. TOURISM RESEARCH INST., AUKLAND
UNIV. OF TECH., COOK ISLANDS TOURISM VISITOR SATISFACTION & IMPACT MONITOR
3 (2007); COOK ISLANDS STATISTICS OFFICE, Tourism Statistics: Visitor Arrivals by
Country of Usual Residence, http://www.stats.gov.ck/Statistics/Tourism/tour-
ismctyofresid.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
54 Tim Hazledine & Stephanie Collins, Paying the Pilot? The Economics of Sub-
sidising International Air Travel to Small Remote Island Nations with Large Diaspora, 17
J. AIR TRANsP. MGMT. 187, 192 (2011).
55 See supra Figure la. As indicated previously, the lack of reliable data-for
commercial reasons-prevents meaningful analysis of the exact operational posi-
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time it was reported that the existing year-old risk-share agree-
ment was being reconsidered,56 it is reasonable to speculate that
Air New Zealand would have likely been facing increasing varia-
ble direct-operating costs (the price of jet fuel being a signifi-
cant contributor, if not directly, then through hedging
contracts) such that demand on the route could not cover costs
in the short-run. Again, commercial confidentiality prevents an
empirical test of these assumptions; however, it is reasonable to
conclude that the unstable jet-fuel prices would have created an
uncertain operating environment in the short-term and, thus,
rendered a joint cost-sharing agreement an acceptable solution
toward mitigating uncertainty.
Second, while technically not offering monopoly RAR-LAX
services (in that other services are possible, save for potentially
significant sunk costs), Air New Zealand holds substantial mar-
ket power that roughly resembles a monopoly. 57 While it cannot
properly be considered a dejure monopoly given that there is no
legal basis for attributing air services to one carrier servicing in-
ternational routes to and from RAR (even with the cost-sharing
agreement in place, although this is admittedly purely specula-
tive), the agreement essentially enhances state-sanctioned mo-
nopolist activities to the point where competitors may be
reluctant to initiate services.
Third, and from a government policy perspective, we can
identify several choices available to the government of the Cook
Islands: (1) accept the uncertainty of access and connectivity by
disengaging the existing cost-sharing agreement; (2) re-engage
with a previously established cost-sharing agreement, subject to
negotiation of amounts and conditions; and (3) seek other ac-
cess options via other carriers.
Proceeding with a re-engagement of the cost-sharing agree-
ment would allow for some degree of certainty in service provi-
sion to the Cook Islands from the United States. The
alternatives would have presented the Cook Islands with the
prospect of no guaranteed access to the lucrative U.S. market.58
For example, there was a report in the Cook Islands News in late
September 2008 that Canadian carrier WestJet may have been
interested in a flight via Honolulu, although this was not at all
tion of Air New Zealand around the time the original "risk-share" agreement had
expired. See supra Part 11I.B.
56 Greig, supra note 47.
57 See Tahara, supra note 48.
58 See Greig, supra note 47.
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certain.59 The CEO of Cook Islands Tourism Corporation
(CITC) indicated that the LAX-RAR flight accounts for 19,000
international long haul visitors.60 Spend data available for Cook
Islands visitors is limited, although a study conducted by the
New Zealand Tourism Research Institute at Auckland University
of Technology, based on a survey of approximately 800 visitors,
revealed that the majority of international (non-New Zealand)
visitors stayed between one and fourteen days.61 North Ameri-
can and European visitors, with a small sample base in the re-
search, are estimated to spend NZ$190 and NZ$201 per day,
respectively.6 2 Press surrounding the cost-sharing agreement in
November 2008 has the CITC quoting an average NZ$200 spent
per visitor per day, although it is not unreasonable to assume
that a substantial proportion of this figure includes accommoda-
tion and transportation.63 Comments attributed to the CEO of
the CITC in the press put the value of tourism to the Cook Is-
lands at NZ$33 million, which includes the value of tourist ex-
penditure plus revenue incurred through port departures and
arrivals.64
Several unknowns surround the Cook Islands-Air New Zea-
land agreement, many of which will likely remain as such owing
to commercial confidentiality. 65 Caution must be used when an-
alyzing cost-sharing agreements from which primary data is not
easily available. First, it is not clear whether the subsidized
amount fluctuates with load factors, yield, or even standard reve-
nue-passenger-kilometer measures. In other words, it is not
clear whether the subsidy covers the total cost of Air New Zea-
land's operations, whether there exists perhaps a minimum load
factor per sector or across a specific time frame, or whether
there is an explicit revenue guarantee where "top-ups" are pro-
vided to a particular threshold.66 Second, it is not clear whether
the agreement ties Air New Zealand operations to the use of a
specific gauge (in this case, a B767) and, by extension, whether
provision was made for a pro rata reduction in subsidy should
Air New Zealand choose to operate more fuel-efficient aircraft
59 Id.
60 Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
61 COOK ISLANDS STATISTICS OFFICE, supra note 53, at 3, 9-10.
62 Id. at 21.
63 Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
64 Id.
65 See supra Part III.B.
66 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66.
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on the route. Finally, it is not clear whether the subsidy is tied to
jet-fuel prices; if not, it can only be speculated whether Air New
Zealand priced the value of the service on the basis of the rather
substantial jet-fuel prices from 2008.67
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS POLICY
As discussed above, access and connectivity are closely aligned
with economic development. The 2007 IATA brief discussed
above noted that the economic value of connectivity from avia-
tion helps drive productivity and overall economic develop-
ment.6 Exports, both hard goods and services such as tourism,
are clear beneficiaries of air access. Selim Ach and Brian Pearce
assessed the competitiveness of travel and tourism and found
that air transport infrastructure, including quantitative and
qualitative measurements, infrastructure quality, available-seat
kilometers, departures per 1,000 residents, airport density, the
number of operating airlines, and network quality were impor-
tant predictor variables.69 This is amplified for remote destina-
tions that rely almost entirely on air access for visitor arrivals.
Cost sharing thus becomes an attractive solution to problems of
access, particularly when routes and sectors are commercially
nonviable. Some primary policy responses available to destina-
tions keen on retaining or attracting air services that may be
nonviable in an open market are summarized in Table 2.
Regardless of policy responses, there exist several implica-
tions, all of which are framed by the state's desire to retain or
enhance relative access and connectivity. The first implication
relates to the role of cost-sharing agreements in wider policies
on access in relation to economic development goals. As air ac-
cess is often associated with tourism as an export-earning activ-
ity, cost shares can become an indirect subsidy of tourism, and
issues of opportunity cost and net social welfare arise as a re-
sult.70 The specific terms and conditions of the cost share would
need to seriously consider several economic variables in an over-
all cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, the shape of the market (as-
67 See Jeff Bailey, Fuel Costs Just Part of Airlines' List of Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2008, at C1.
68 Smyth & Pearce, supra note 12.
69 Selim Ach & Brian Pearce, How Well Does the Travel & Tourism Competitiveness
Index Explain Differences in Travel Intensity Among Countries?, in THE TRAVEL &
TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009, at 55, 60 (Jennifer Blanke & Thea
Chiesa eds., 2009).
70 See, e.g., Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
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No subsidy Advantages: Competition possible if favourable mar-
ket conditions exist.
Disadvantages: Patchy, seasonal, and generally spo-
radic air services, possibly provided by foreign carri-
ers; Limited network linkages and connectivity;
Potential for nonviable services in the long-term,
causing incumbent carrier(s) to exit market
Cost-share (underwrite) Advantages: Assurance of access.
Disadvantages: Potential for some conditions to be
levied by airline that would require additional
resources (i.e., marketing); Market shape altered
(opportunity cost of lost competition).
Joint venture Advantages: Assurance of access through joint mar-
keting and promotional programmes, thus ensuring
consistency of messaging.
Disadvantages: Extensive consultation with wider
policy community, public governance structures,
and private stakeholders could create delays.
TABLE 2: POLICY LEVERS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
suming a market model) is potentially affected significantly if
access privilege is vested with a single carrier as a result of a cost-
share.71
The second implication relates to sources of funding. Cost
shares need not be overt underwrites-however transparent-of
existing or new air services. 72 They can take other, more strate-
gic forms.73 Examples include joint advertising budgets and
campaigns and the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in a cost-
share agreement.74 For instance, a joint-destination advertising
campaign can include partners such as a local airport, the local
government, and the destination marketing organization, in ad-
dition to a specific airline.75 These reflect dynamic and flexible
partnership configurations and arrangements between multiple
stakeholders, including airports, destination marketing organi-
zations, and airlines.
The third implication relates to post hoc policies governing re-
vision and monitoring. Econometric analyses can assist in the
modeling of passenger movement relative to independent vari-
71 See id.
72 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32, at A3.
73 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32.
74 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32; Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
75 See, e.g., Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
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ables that are seen to exert influence, 76 yet caution must be ex-
ercised in that there would not exist a meaningful control group
that would assist in measuring the impact of a cost-share ar-
rangement. In remote destinations where air services are essen-
tial, this is somewhat easier to track given that the cessation of
air services can effectively mean a drastic drop in arrivals.77
VI. THE FUTURE OF COST-SHARE ARRANGEMENTS
It is plausible that more air-service provisions could become
subsidized publicly in the near future in those states where spa-
tial accessibility or connectivity is limited and, thus, of limited
attraction for private providers. There are several reasons for
this. First, it is commonly known that commercial airlines be-
came increasingly risk averse during the 2008 and 2009 global
recession. 78 Decisions relating to markets served are thus influ-
enced by access to limited capital and financing options as well
as rapidly shrinking demand due to depressed economies in key
markets that comprise otherwise profitable inbound and out-
bound traffic flows. Carriers also face uncertain unit costs in the
immediate future, whether through long-run marginal cost in-
creases due to high costs of capital or fuel hedging losses.
Those states with limited accessibility and connectivity will be
most at risk as trading conditions continue to deteriorate. Al-
though industry-wide conditions show some signs of improve-
ment for 2010, 79 it is likely that some states will need to monitor
carefully the financial viability of their existing air-service provi-
sion, especially where provided by foreign carriers, and assess
whether such services are in jeopardy.
Second, and related, most geographically-separated countries
globally rely on services from providers that are not designated
as national carriers.8 ° Cases that are especially vulnerable are
those where carriers provide services within thin market origin-
destination pairs-when demand from an origin may be de-
pressed due to economic reasons, supply at the destination is
limited due to size and developmental factors, or both. Indeed,
several islands in the Pacific Region fall under this category. As
76 See, e.g., id.; Subsidy Increase, Direct Flight to LA to Continue, CooK ISLANDS
TIMES WKLY., Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.ciherald.co.ck/articles/t278e.htm.
77 See Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
78 See, e.g., Millman & Esterl, supra note 32.
79 Nicola Clark, Trade Group Sees Profit in '1O for Airlines as a Whole, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2010, at B5.
80 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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discussed above, the cost-sharing agreement between Air New
Zealand and the Cook Islands government emulates in principle
access-assurance programs in other parts of the world.8 1
Owing to market uncertainties and challenges to cost and
yield by many airlines worldwide, it is reasonable to surmise that
the raw number of cost-share arrangements, in a variety of for-
mats, could increase. Where they are inevitable due to apparent
commercial non-viability, consideration must be given to the
protectionist nature of the public subsidization of air-service
provision as national policy. While protectionist measures do
not necessarily align with liberal policies toward trade and in-
vestment including air transport, it can be argued that less-con-
nected destinations-cities, regions, or entire states-may need
to utilize direct subsidization to protect air access and maximize
national welfare when existing market conditions do not war-
rant profitable unsubsidized services. In some cases, the level
and type of subsidy, whether per seat or lump sum, may well
depend on the structure of the market and, as noted, the bar-
gaining power of both parties.
Finally, it is important to note that air-service provision may
also fall within wider development-aid programs as manifested
between developed and developing countries.8 2 In the case of
the Pacific Islands, the New Zealand Prime Minister indicated in
March 2009 that subsidization, through direct New Zealand gov-
ernment underwriting, of air services to nation states such as
Tonga and Samoa is generally consistent with foreign-aid
policy.83
VII. CONCLUSION
Economic theory suggests that those states with smaller or
weaker factors of production are more likely to engage in poli-
cies that favor the subsidization of what would be seen as essen-
tial economic services. 84 Direct public subsidization would thus
be used to correct market failure and imbalances.85 This article
81 See supra Part IV.
82 E.g., New Zealand Government to Support Tonga and Samoa with Air NZ Services,




84 Baldev Raj Nayar, Regimes, Power, and International Aviation, 49 IrNr'L ORG.
139, 144 (1995).
85 See supra Part III.B.
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has provided an overview of the economic efficiency, from a so-
cial-welfare perspective, of public and private risk-sharing agree-
ments in air-service provision. It argued that term-limited ex ante
public and private cost-share agreements, not entirely dissimilar
to the Air New Zealand-Cook Islands example discussed above,
may represent a move toward more permanent subsidization by
states of air-service provision in uncertain economic environ-
ments and where private investment is either reduced or
unlikely.
From a policy response perspective, states may follow one or
more of the potential levers outlined herein, but on the assump-
tion that adequate and reliable data are available, there is a
need to undertake a full cost-benefit analysis and wider
econometric studies in order to justify the policy before imple-
mentation. We have argued throughout that in periods of eco-
nomic instability there is greater scope for states to seek means
of access assurance, of which cost sharing is but one example.
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